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Germany's Guestworkers 
PHILIP L. MARTIN 
t It is a myth that guestworkers represent a labor subsidy 
. to some employers, with'out cost to society as a whole. 
\'Temporary migration" soon becomes Permanent, and 
tlie costs of integrating new minority families are borne by all taxpayers. 
Au,lander rpu,! 'l'he ~ogau appe.,, fre<Juently in 
streetside graffiti. The right-wing NationaJ-demokra. 
tische Partei Deutschland (NPD) made "Foreigners 
out. Germany for the Germans!" its slogan during 
the October 1980 election. Expert opinion says that 
a maiority of Germans would prefer to see most of 
the foreigners leave. Most Germans now believe 
that the 20-year attempt to spur economic growth 
with foreign workers is producing more costs than benefits. 
number of Mexicans to work in this country six 
months each year. President Reagan is known to be 
farn,,bJe to sech a VCogc,n,, He ceported/y di~ 
cussed a migrant worker program with Mexico's 
l're,ident ,Jo,, LOpez Portillo sho,tly before lakiog 
office in January 1981, and renewed these discus-
sions during the Mexican President's visit to Wash-
ington in June. Given our illegal immigration, what 
can we learn from the Germans about a guest worker solution? 
· Pli!Ljp L, MARTIN S A~~i,t, hofearo, in the De,anmen, of Ag,;,,i,.,,,, Ecooom;c,, Uni,e,s;,y of 
C,J~orn;, " n.,;, This o,ooi, ;, b""d P•'11y on• forth,.,,,ing book on '"'"""ion,11,b,, mi,eeoon, ,op. Ported by the German Marshall Fund. 
The German mi1m1nt labor experiment is going 
awry just when the United States may begin a mi-
grant worker program with Mexico. Senators Raya. 
kawa (R-Ca.) and Schmitt (R-NM) have proposed 
a "companero" program to permit an unspecified 
'fhe 4.5 millioo foreigne,s io Ge,maoy a,e lf,e 
last vestige of the waves of Gastarbeiter imported 
between 1960 and 1973 to help fuel noninflation-
a.ty economic growth. The Germans intended to 
import temporary "guestworkers"-poor peasants 
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from southern Italy, Yugoslavia,· Greece, Turkey, 
Portugal, and Spain for one or two years' work at 
high German wage_S.·\Vhile abroad, these migrants 
were expected to send home the money so desper-
ately needed to accelerate economic development 
Returning migrants with industrial skills were ex-
pected to find jobs in factories that had been cre-
ated by their remittances, putting labor-exporting 
countries on the road to an economic takeoff. With 
the gradual elimination of the poverty and unem-
ployment that drove poor peasants abroad, tempo-
rary labor migration vlas eventually expected to 
stop. 
The optimism .of the 1960s has soured. The idea 
that "mutual benefits" naturally arise from tempo-
rary labor flows has left a legacy of minority prob-
lems in labor-recruiting Germany and distorted eco-
nomic development in most of the labor-sending 
nations. The 1980s mark a new turn in European 
and especially German guestworker policies, a rec-
ognition that while guestworkers provide immediate 
economic benefits to selected employers, workers, 
and consumers, they later impose hotly d~bated 
integration costs on the whole society. This lesson 
of immediate selective economic benefits but de-
ferred general socioeconomic costs has important 
implications for the 20-odd bills pending in Con-
gress to initiate a large-scale guest worker program 
in the United States. 
Early optimism 
West Germany began economic reconstruction in 
1949 with massive unemployment. Even-after cur-
rency reform and the "social market economy" 
put Germany on the path of sustained economic 
growth, unemployment persisted because of the in-
flux of East German refugees. Isolated labor short-
ages first appeared in 1955, when German farmers 
requested permission to hire Italian harvest labor. 
Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement 
with Italy late in the same year. But it soon be-
came apparent that the family farms of Germany 
were not going to require much foreign labor: the 
real need for labor was in the German factories 
producing cars, machine tools, steel, and consumer 
durables for booming export and domestic markets. 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) and guaranteed 
citizens of member states the right to work in any 
EEC nation. West Germany continued to recruit 
EEC Italians and ahsorb refugees fleeing East Ger-
many. The Berlin Wall closed the door to West 
Germany in 1961, encouraging labor-short Ccrman. 
manufacturers to otist a wider net for additional la-
bor. Germany concluded labor agrcemc>nts with 
Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in 1960-61. 
The guestworkers corning to (lermany were USU· 
ally unskilled males between 20 and 40, and were 
initially recruited by German employers and bi-
lateral commissions. But word-of-mouth soon led 
to waiting lists of Turks and Spaniards, each anx-
ious for his chance to earn high Uerman wages. 
German employers, in discussions with plant-level 
works councils, decided how many aliens they 
needed and what nationality was preferred. A re-
quest for 1,000 Turks was sent t.o the local Employ-
ment Service office, which first macle a pro forma 
check to see if Germans were available. If they 
were not--and this was the case 95 percent of the 
time---the request was passed on to a bilateral re-
cruitment mission in Turkey, where an individual 
already screened for health, skills and a crinw-free 
background would be awarded a German residence 
permit and a one-year work contract with a specif-
ic employer. The German Labor Office arranged 
and paid for transportation to Germany, where em-
ployers typically provided barracks-style housing. 
In the late 1960s, 5,000 guestworkers were arriving 
daily in Germany, part of the most massive "lrn-
man trade" in Europe's peacetime history. One day 
after arrival, the guestworker was at work on the 
assembly line or at the construction site. 
The notion that temporary !abor migration pro-
vides benefits to both sending and receiving coun· 
tries was so powerful that the number of ostensibly 
temporary guest workers swelled beyond anyone's 
original expectations. In 1960, Germany had fewer 
than 300,000 guestworkers, mostly Italian. By 
1972, the 2.5 million guestworkers in Germany, 
mainly Turks and Yugoslavs, wete 12 percent of the 
work force. Foreign workers were more common 
than Germans in some construction crews and on 
assembly lines. The alien workers sweeping streets 
· and collecting garbage became a visible reminder of 
the German economy's increasing dependenc<;. on 
foreign workers. 
Most of Germany's first guestworkers shuttled 
in and out of Germany as,expected. The widely 
publicized Rotationsprinzip worked when reces-
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sion struck late in 1966. One year later, almost 
500,000 gucstworkers were gone, their jobs pre-
sumably available for unemployed Germans. 
But the continued movement of foreign workers 
in and out of Germany obscured the fact tfiat more 
and_ more temporary "guest~" had been German 
residents for four or five years. Migrants were ex-
pensive to German employers, requiring the pay-
ment of recruitment fees, translation, housing, and 
training costs, and the same wages ana fringe bene-
s paid to native workers .. German employers did 
t want to send a trained migrant home just be-
cause a one- or two-year work contract expired and 
then repeat the recruitnwn!. training, and housing 
process with an unknown alien. The migrants them-
selves were not anxious to return Lo the low wages 
and unemployment they had left or~specially 
for Greeks and Spaniards during dictatorship eras 
-the lack of political freedom in their native 
countries. 
Permanence 
The German guestworker system originally envi-
sioned the shuttling of temporary alien workers 
through "permanent" manufacturing jobs, jobs re-
quiring someone else to fill them after the short-
term migrant had departed. The self-interest of em-
ploye11. and migrants, however, inevitably encour-
aged a permanent rather than a temporary employ-
ment relationship. 
The unions, churches, and migrant welfare or-
ganizations pressed the German government "to 
improve the status of migrants.'' A series of ad-
ministrative rulings and government decisions in 
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the late 1960s and early 1970s. effectively gave 
most guestworkers the sa1~1e rights as EEC nation-
als: once in Germany, the "guests" could not be 
forced out. 
Instead of being forced to return, guestworkers 
obtained rights to have their dependents join them 
in Germany after one year's employment if they 
had proof of suitable housing. The predictable re-
sult was a stream of dependents eligible for Ger-
man children's allowances (now $135 monthly for 
three children) and requiring education in Ger-
many. Migrants mov(;d to particular sections 
(ghettos) of the largest German cities, giving Frank-
furt, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Munich separate little 
ltalys and Turkish, Spanish, Yugoslav, and Greek 
enclaves. The subway running through the Kreuz-
berg district of Berlin-which now has the third 
largest Turkish population of any city in the world 
-has been ·dubbed the "Orient Express." As for-
eigners moved in, Germans moved out, making the 
ethnic communities islands in the German cities. 
Educating and housing migrant dependents fi-
nally made the public at large aware of Max Frisch's 
aphorism, "We asked for workers and got men." 
The presence of so many workers and dependents 
for so long made the original employer promise of 
a "short-term" need for alien labor seem ever more 
hollow. Popular discontent with, burgeoning for-
eign populations and narrowly defeated referenda 
to reduce the foreign workforce sharply in neigh-
boring Switzerland made aliens a public issue. Ger-
many is now debating the trade-offs between labor 
needs for economic growth and the rise of ethnic 
minorities and tensions in relatively homogeneous 
Germany. 
Halt to recruitment 
Tension rose when employer needs for alien labor to 
sustain noninflationary economic growth clashed 
with popular fears that ostensibly short-term guest-
workers were becoming backdoor permanent im-
migrants. In February 1973, the government an-
nounced that the recruitment fee would be in-
creased from a nominal 350 DM to 1,000 DM per 
worker in September to discourage "overreliance" 
on aliens. Employers responded by importing 
500,000 migrants in the spring and summer of 
1973, more than ever before. The October 1973 
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Middle East War and subsequent oil embargo. 
prompted widespread fears of an economic reces-
sion. The German/ government stopped migrant 
worker recruitment on November 22, 1973, an ac-
tion that was justified by the feared recession~ 
Many contemporary observers, however, thought 
the government had at last found a convenient ex-
cuse to halt immigration and reassess policies with-
out offending employers. 
The 1973 halt to recruitment was accompanied 
by a series of measures to mute other critics. No 
guestworker would be' forced to leave Germany 
against his or her will, although migrants would be 
"encouraged" to -return to jobs created in German-
subsidized factories in their homelands. Migrants 
could continue fetching their dependents, but 
wives and teenagers wanting to work would have to 
wait several years before they could get work per-
mits. Money to provide housing, social services, 
~-.::_,----
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and special education for migrant children was al-
located to cities with high con.centrations of for-
eigners. 
Patterns since 1-973 
Seven years have elapsed since Germany ended its 
labor-·importation experiment. The number of for-
eign workers has been cut 20 percent to 2 million, 
but the total foreign population is now at an all-
time high of 4.5 million. During the 1960s, almost 
all migrcmts in Germany were working, contribu-
ting to expensive social welfare programs but re-
ceiving few benefits. Today, however, nonworking _ 
4 
~ r··· ggl!! ¥2tr,;illtiii(;,ot~~¥ ;· s ; a: !I! .-.~ 
14 ._. rf:7 
-
-. 
' . 
dependents outnumber migrant workers in Ger-
many. Since migrant families tend to be bigger and 
poorer, they ofte;1 draw larger social welfare bene-
fits than native Germans. 
The old economic issues are rarely raised today. 
In the ] 960s, economists debated the contribu-
tions of migrants to Europe's rapid postwar growth 
(most believed they were a significantly positive in-
fluence). Some economists argued that employers 
were getting migrants too easily, discouraging the 
search for tabor-saving innovations necessary to 
compete with foreign competitors (Japan, for ex-
ample). 
The work-related issue receiving most attention 
in the 1960s was the role of aliens in German trade 
unions. Marxists argued that aliens were a structur-
al requirement of advanced capitalism, necessary 
to do society's dirty work and divide the working 
class with ethnic and linguistic barriers. German 
unio~s established special migrant departments and 
issued a variety of publications in the migrants' 
own languages, but permitted only slow migrant 
advances within the union hierarchy. The migrants 
\~hemselves were reluctant to become too entangled 
'Q strange unions, since mofit believed they would 
b£\abroad only a few years, and were far more in-
terested in achieving a savings target than in im-
proving working conditions that were already far 
better than anything at home. 
Sociopolitical issues have replaced economic ques-
tions. The fundamental issue is whether 15 years of 
importing the alien labor requested by employers 
has made Germany an immigration country. The 
official line has not changed--Germany is not an 
immigration land. Instead, no new aliens are to be 
admitted and those present are to be integrated as 
rapidly and fully as possible. However, the "desire 
to return" is also to be strengthened and assisted 
wherever possible. As will become apparent, this 
"policy" is marked by contradictions and made in,-
effective by seemingly irreversible processes set in 
motio{l over the past two decades. 
Immigration 
The German economy in the 1960s offered enor-
mous profit opportunities. Capital to build fac-
tories and markets to sell products were readily 
available. The only thing standing in the way of 
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· profit was insufficient lab9r. Unemployment r<!tes 
hovered around zero a.nd, even though relatively 
few German women worked, employers did not 
think women could be induced into noisy factories 
and arduous construction jobs. If a little foreign la-
bor were available for the few years in which this 
extraordinary economic situation was expected to 
last, then private profits, low inflation, extra tax 
monies, upward mobility for natives, and economic 
development among Germany's poorer neighbors 
were only a few of the blessings which, it was prom-
ised, would follow. 
The German people were largely opposed to 
(remd (strange) people as immigrants. Germany 
committed itself to accepting the ethnic Germans 
fleeing Eastern Europe but few immigrants from 
other lands. The German employers were politically 
successful: t!)ey convinced the German people that 
alien workers would remain guests. Hence, Ger-
many could admit 500,000 migrant workers an-
nually and still proclaim that it was not an immi-
gration land. 
The 4.5 million foreigners in Germany are only 
7 percent of its 61 million people. But no German 
politician can simply say that the borders will re-
main closed and the resident foreigners absorbed as 
a snake digests a mouse. To accept the 4.5 million 
as immigrants is to break a past pro,mise to the Ger-
man people and to make more explicit the current 
distributional consequences of past guestworker 
practices. 
Germany's guest workers helped particular seg-
ments of German society between 1960 and 1973. 
They expedited upward mobility for some natives, 
lowered prices for consumers (including foreign 
consumers, since many guestworker-produced 
goods, such as Volkswagens to America, were ex-
ported) and provided taxes for governments. But, 
above all, guestworkers increased employers' prof-
its. These profits were concentrated in the hands of 
the major manufacturing and construction firms 
(and their shareholders). 
The profits from guestworkers were enjoyed tly 
one segment of the population at one point but the 
costs of guestworkers are now being shared by 
everyone. Guestworkers turned out to be a labor 
subsidy to employers using them. These employers' 
profits could have been taxed to provide funds to 
integrate current resident aliens and their children. 
1510 
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But the myth that foreigners were only temporary 
workers, not permanent immigrants, effectively 
squelched the notion of taxing employers or their 
goods to pay later integration and infrastructure 
costs. 
The most dangerous myth surrounding guest-
workers programs is that they are a labor subsidy 
to selected employers, without cost to society. 
The notion that temporary individuals can be ro-
tated through permanent jobs is ultimately rejected 
in industrial democracies ( with the exception of 
South Africa) but the 'guestworker concept pre-
vents the enactment of taxes to pay the _integra-
tion costs that · inevitably accompany migrant 
workers. 
Can there be integration? 
Germany remains unsure whether it wants resident 
foreigners to become immigrants, but it is sure it 
wants to "integrate" them into German society 
while they are present. Helmut Schmidt made the 
integration of foreigners the top domestic pri-ority 
when he addressed the first meeting of Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) repre-sentatives after his 
October 1980 reelection. The liberal SPD argues 
that integration is the reward for the migrants' 
past economic contributions but, Mr. Schmidt was 
quick to add, "four million is enough." Integration 
is not a simple matter, he continued: "It's not easy 
for Germans who live in an apartment house and 
who don't like the smell of garlic to have to put up 
with it and even to have a lamb slaughtered in the 
hallway." The dilemma is how to integrate foreign-
ers when the final goal-citizenship and full par-
ticipation-cannot be uttered yet. 
The integration dilemma is compounded by 
more than German reluctance to convert immi-
grant workers into citizens. The migrants them-
seJves want the permanent right to work in Ger-
many far more than the right to vote in German 
elections. The migrants' home countries are not 
anxious to lose citizens (and possibly remittances); 
hence they protest any steps to expedite now cum-
bersome naturalization procedures. 
The 1.4 million Turks are a special problem. 
Their Islamic religion and relativ~ poverty alienate 
them from German society. Political divisions at 
home have been carried'· to Germany. Rightist 
. ".s] 
"grey wolves" extort money from Turkish workers 
and businesses to finance political agitation for an 
Islamic Turkish state. These right-wing extremists 
are held responsible for attacks on more moderate 
and leftist Turks in "termany, but the closed Turk· 
ish communities in Germany are just as impene-
trable .as U.S. Chinatowns were a hundred years 
ago. German authorities fear Turkish unrest, but 
find it difficult to anticipate and control it. Adolf 
Schmidt, head of the mining and energy workers' 
union, complains that "re-Islamization" leads to 
isolation,· making Turkish workers reluctant to 
quaff a beer with German workmates. 
Integration proceeds under so many constraints 
and uncertainties that current measures cannot be 
said to represent a consistent policy. The main 
focus is on the children of foreign workers·-the 
second generation. These children, many of whom 
have only visited their country of citizenship, are 
caught between tradition-bound parents still cling-
i~ to the hope of returning and Geiman author-
ities anxious to avoid an uneducated proletariat. 
Germany's migrants and its institutions now stand 
apart. The official integration policy is to change 
the migrants so they can effectively utilize existing 
education and training institutions. Germany is 
strongly resisting the notion that its institutions 
may have to change to absorb the foreigners, even 
though the first such changes are already apparent. 
In Cologne, the Ruhr cities, and parts of Berlin, 
school authorities are experimenting with cross-
town busing to avoid the school segregation that 
results from housing patterns. Multilingual teaching 
is the official policy only in Bavaria, but even the 
after-hours classes in native languages arc produc-
ing demands to import teachers, since "only fellow 
foreigners can truly maintain the child's original 
culture." Religious teachers are already imported 
( and paid by Germany), prompting protests that 
Turkish mullahs are being paid by Gernum author-
ities to teach hatred for secular-Germans. Parents 
(and the child's grades) decide whether ten-year-
olds will follow a college preparatory track, pursue 
vocational training, or simply obtain a general edu-
·cation. Some reforms urge the creation of Gesamt-
schulen( unified schools) modeled on American mid-
dle and high sc.hools, to postpone decisions long 
enough ·for the migrant child to make up his own 
mind. ' 
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Wiil Germany be able to integrate her 4.5 mil-
lion foreigners? \Viii German integration strains re-
semble those of ~he American civil rights move-
ment? 
lntegration may require several generatioµs. Cur-
rent integration programs represent efforts to head 
off future problems, 11ot a response to migrant de-
. mands. Most migrants remain divided, having 
brought their religious, social, and political differ-
ences with them and continuing to follow closely 
activities of their factions at home. 
The most important difference between Ger-
many's migrants and America's minorities is eco-
nomic. Germany's guestworkers earn "above aver-
age" incomes for unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
because they ~!agcrly accept night, weekend, and 
overtime shifts. Despite a worrisome upward trend 
in migrant unemployment, the economic disadvan-
tage of American minorities is not present 111 Ger-
many; 
Current issues 
'l;'ostwar Germany adopted a two-lrack immigration 
r~licy. Few permanent immigrants were antici-
pa~d but a liberal refugee provision of the Basic 
Law willingly accepted millions of ethnic Germans 
fleeing Eastern Europe. Afler 1960, immigration 
policy was determined by the short-term labor 
needs of employers. The current dilemma is decid-
ing how to turn "backdoor" !abor importation into 
a humanitarian immigration policy for the fulurc. 
Illegal immigration is a persisting worry despite 
border controls, identity cards, police registration, 
and tough sanctions on employers hiring illegal 
aliens ( up to three and a half years in jail plus 
$30,000 fines). Most estimates place the number of 
illegal aliens at 200,000 to 300,000-10 to 15 per-
cent of the iegal alien workforce. Germany's illegal 
aliens are concentrated in agriculture, restaurants 
and hotels, and construction firms. German unions 
(and s~me employers) are demanding stepped-up 
enforcement of existing laws. 
German unemployment rates have been low 
since the late 1950s, and youth unemployment is 
traditionally less than average. Economic changes 
and the presence of so many aliens promise to 
change this historic relationship. So far, youth un-
employment primarily afflicts aliens who did not 
finish secondary school and failed to find an ap-
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prenticeship slot. The problem is that a dangerous 
gap is developing between' the.,se youths' expecta-
tions and the realities of the German labor market. 
Problems of sending countries 
Germany's migrant workers are often reluctant to 
return home because economic conditions have 
worsened since massive labor emigration began. 
Most of the Southern European countries sending 
labor north were "showered with glittering coins" 
and a host of econonu~ problems that increased 
their dependence on rich neighbors. The result is a 
180-degree turn in attitudes toward emigration in 
many sending countries. Instead of welcoming the 
chance to export unemployment, some of these 
_ countries are now demanding compensation for the 
"brawn drain." 
Exporting labor provides jobs and incomes for 
many who may be unemployed at home. But the 
dangers of exporting labor are manifold. The most 
immediate problem is to match German labor needs 
with a poor country's unemployed workers. Ger-
mans want the best and brightest workers, not 
poor peasants requiring months of training and 
adaptation. 
Since German wages are so high, it is not hard to 
attract a poor country's shilled workers. But poor 
countries need to export unskilled labor, not the 
skilled labor needed for their own development. 
Incentives work in the opposite direction, as shown 
by the Turkish experience. One estimate now puts 
85 percent of all skilled Turkish workers in Ger-
many.Turkish productivity falls as women and chil-
dren are drafted to replace men, encouraging many 
planners to throw up their hands and demand mod-
ern, imported, and expensive German machinery in 
new factories. The result is that Turkey, with 50 
percent unemployment and underemployme~l has 
some. plants that are more modern than those em-
ploying Turks in Ge;many. 
Labor shortages are most immediately felt in 
agriculture, since men typically leave their famili~s 
in rural villages as they go first to Turkish cities 
and then abroad. In theory, their departure and the 
chance to. live on savings from abroad should en-
able children to stay in school and permit small in-
efficient plots to be consolidated for a more pro-
ductive agriculture. But jobs abroad are uncertain, 
so families keep their plots and work them, half-
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heartedly, as insurance against lay9ff or injury to 
the breadwinner abroad. Instead of a dynamic and 
efficient agriculture, tJiere is often less intensive 
farming of land, iric:;easing food imports and de-
pendence on the rich countries dominating interna-
tional grain exports. 
Remittances from workers abroad are important, 
often covering a poor country's oil importing bill. 
But so much money injected into a poor country 
with bare ~helves encourages a flood of consumer 
imports. Instead of investing remittance monies in 
shaky banks or even mtne shaky stock markets, 
guestworkers seek more immediate gratification. 
The typical retunJed migrant brings back- a car 
filled with consumer durables, hoping to become a 
taxi driver. Few save patiently and invest in new 
job-creating factories. 
Returning migrants seem to reject the manual 
work they did before departure and while abroad. 
The slogan "work in Germany but live in Turkey" 
encourages rapid expansion of the urban service 
sector. Land and housing prices escalate, accentua-
ting inflation as too much money chases too few 
goods. Families unlucky enough not to have at feast 
one guestworker are _hurt by_ the higher prices 
brought on by the money from a.broad. 
Guestworker families may be richer but may not 
remain families in still traditional societies. So many 
men abroad leads to villages of women and chil-
dren. Traditional patriarchial family structures 
break down and are not replaced. Many men live 
more or less permanently abroad with one wife but 
continue returning to an otherwise abandoned wife 
once a year. Some observers fear that childrep raised . 
in such a vacuum will be a source of urban unrest, 
since their expectations are shaped by foreign jobs 
arid wages but they have no chance to emigrate. 
Remittances could be the spur to achieve an eco-
nomic takeoff. But there is nothing automatic in 
the flow of savings to guarantee that the extra one 
o'.r -two billion dollars will accelerate development. 
The lesson in most countries is that remittances are 
a short-run salve, not the beginnings of a long-run 
cure. Labor exporters must be very careful or the 
short-run help may mask distortions that can re-
tard development. 
Lessons for the United States 
" At least 20 different bills pending in Congress pro-
• 
pose some sort of European-style guestworker pro-
gram for the United States. The justifications of· 
fered for these billsare threefold. This country's 
2,000 mile border with Mexico cannot be effective· 
ly controlled without a repugnant Berlin-style wall. 
Even if control were possible, the United States has 
tolerated illegal Mexican entries for so long that it 
cannot ·abruptly close the Mexican "safety valve," 
especially when the scale of Mexican oil and gas re-
serves is becoming clear. The United States now 
ha!'i an "uncontrolled" alien labor program, so why 
not legalize reality and manage labor migration? 
Some guestworke~ proponents argue that this 
country needs alien labor "to do the jobs Ameri 0 
cans won't do" (preserving good supervisory jobs 
in the process), to prevent wage inflation, and to 
reduce looming social security deficits. These guest-
worker advocates believe that young and mobile 
Mexicans can fill labor market gaps, contribute 
payroll taxes to strained social welfare programs, 
and be returned before they pose any, integration 
threat. 
The counterarguments are moral, economic,_and 
practical. Opponents argue that a class of helots is 
morally offensive .in a democracy even if the indi-
vidual aliens and their U.S. employers b!'nefit. 
Economists note that alien labor is a subsidy to 
employers, a hidden subsidy that preserves jobs in 
the kinds of industries the United States doesn't 
want. Economists also question the need for alien 
labor in an era of high unemployment and very 
high youth unemployment .. If tractable aliens are 
available, will employers really try to hire often re-
calcitrant native youth? Finally, opponents note 
that this country has no national identity card to 
distinguish legal and illegal aliens easily, nor sanc-
tions on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, 
making "control" a hollow promise. 
Europe's 20-year experience with guestworkers 
yields three lessons for the American debate. First, 
labor flows are easier to start than to stop. Once 
they are set in motion it is very d!fficult to reverse 
the incentives_ that tie aliens to employers. The 
longer aliens stay abroad, the more likely they are 
t0 obtain rights to bring their families. Dependents 
accompanying alien workers require housing and a 
variety of public and private services, giving rise to 
the integration-versus-return conundrum. The pri-
vate services are sometimes ,provided by fellow 
aliens, creating more jobs in ethnic restaurants and 
. .,, -
{~s~=: 
>':'\~~,-
July-A tigu.~t 1981 /Challenge. 41 
,J:r- 'IC :+rt .-C -.#··,.., .... • *4:i\li! • 14 f t, 7111 lttatr t;; u&: lliiU '-\_,~~....,...""~""" 
.,._ .. =";l,,,""'l"_,..._....,. __ ""'~~---·N~M"!l<*"-··--~ ........... .w.""''""µa•a ... ,... 4?i_; ........ , •• - .... _lll'!!!' ..f!tl!!i,~.J.'ll!IJllldMP-"""ll.!I!""" ...... ,... u.... , . .......... """ililo• .... - ... ,.,,. ,..zu.,.:_-!OI'_ ........ ,.,..,.-· .... , ..... 41_,. ...... ....,., -...J"'-·~~·~ .... .. 
I 
' .. .. 
,,_ 
I; 
. I 
entertainment establishments and making the mi-
gration process self-feeding. Information about 
jobs and the protection of an ethnic community 
can give rise to· illegal immigration after labor re-
cruitment is stopped. In short, the alien l~bor tap is 
far easier to open than to close, especially in de-
lnocrncies concerned w_ith human rights. 
'l'he second lesson from Europe is that the alien 
cur.e is short-lived. Alien labor is imported to curb 
labor shortages. There is nothing inherent in the 
guestworker process that" naturally reduces future 
needs for alien ·labor. Instead, employers become 
"addicted" to docile aliens, which discourages the 
search for labor-saving innovations and ways to im-
prove wages and working conditions. Aliens raised 
in a poor country may eagerly accept an industrial 
society's "dirty work," but their children reared 
abroad may reject their parents' jobs. Thus, labor-
importers may be put on a treadmill, forever con-
de!nned to import more and more foreigners to do 
society's dirty work. 
The third lesson from Europe involves the ef-
fects of emigration on poor countries t~at export 
·· Jabor. In theory, the return of remittances and now 
t:.:1ined migrants should ~pur economic develop-
1ilfi,nt, eventually equalizing economic conditions 
bet*een labor-sending and receiving areas. But the 
European experience shows that labor emigration 
is as likely to distort as to accelerate economic de-
velopment. The "best and brightest" tend to leave 
and stay abroad, since they are the first to adapt to 
industrial life and its rewards. Remittances are 
both uncertain and uncontrolled, likely to be re-
duced just when emigration countries need them 
most and as likely to end up being spent for im-
ported cars and consumer durables as invested in 
job-creating factories. Instead of making poor 
countries economically independent, labor emigra-
tion often increases the dependence of poor coun• 
tries on their rich neigh bors. 
·It is sometimes said that aliens bring out the 
worst instincts in people. The dilemma facing all 
industrial democracies is how to choose those few 
immigrants permitted to enter the doors of wealth. 
For most of its history, the United States per-
mitted employers (labor needs) to determine the 
magnitude of immigration. Since 1952, American 
immigration law has given-priority to humanitarian 
reasons for entry. But the reality of illegal immigra-
tion means that employer labor needs are respon~ 
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sible for perhaps twice as many illegal entrants as 
are admitted legally each year under a humanitar-
ian law. The United States'" de jure humanitarian 
policy is being swamped by its de facto economic 
immigration. 
In the debate over how to reform American im-
migration law one fact stands clear. The United 
States accepts more immigrants than any other 
country, t~ice as many as the rest of the world 
combined. Anti-immigrant feeling, the fortress 
mentality, is -011 the rise in b_oth this country and 
Europe. Employers want access to alien labor de-
spite the general anti:imiuigrant mood, and prom-
ise that temporary guestworkers mean all benefits 
and no costs. Guestworkers do provide immediate 
benefits to selected employers and consumers. The 
problem is that in a democracy, costs inevitably fol-
low and are borne by the whole society, not just 
the beneficiaries of guestworkers. The fundamental 
problem is this distributional one: benefits accrue 
to one group at one time but costs are deferred to 
everyone at a later date. 
Immigrants, unlike guestworkers, receive educa-
tion and training and the other benefits available 
to all U.S. citizens. Most immigrants' earnings 
catch up to those of similarly educated natives af-
ter ten to twenty years. The fact that immigrants' 
integration costs are apparent from the outset pro-
vides a built-in control .mechanism that prevents 
one social group ( employers or advocates for one 
ethnic or religious group) from expanding immi-
grant numbers too rapidly. 
Immigration, especially illegal entry, is one of 
the unresolved problems for the 1980s. The United 
States is the world's immigration land. But it cannot 
continue its de facto acceptance of illegal immi-
grants and escape future integration costs and civil 
rights dilemmas. Instead of choosing a short-term 
guestworker solution to the illegal immigr1ition di-
lemma, the United States could take the lead in 
finding ways to help potential migrants more ef-
fectively at home. If the industrial world does not 
act soon, it may be faced with the human wave envi-
sioned by former Algerian President Boumedienne, 
who said that "no quantity of atomic bombs could 
stem t~e tide of billions ... who will some day leave 
the poor southern part of the world to erupt into 
the relatively accessible spaces of the rich northern 
hemisphere looking for survival." The clock is tick-
ing away . 
